Abstract: For most of human history, human knowledge was considered to be something that was stored and captured by words. This began to change when Galileo said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. Today, Dan Dennett and many others argue that all genuine scientific knowledge is in the form of mathematical algorithms. However, recently discovered neurocomputational algorithms can be used to justify the claim that there is genuine knowledge which is non-algorithmic. The fact that these algorithms use prototype deployment, rather than mathematics or logic, gives us good reason to believe that there is a kind of knowledge that we derive from stories that is different from our knowledge of algorithms. Even though we would need algorithms to build a system that can make sense out of stories, we do not need to use algorithms when we ourselves embody a system that learns from stories. The success of the Galilean perspective in the physical sciences has often resulted in an attempt to mathematize the humanities. I am arguing that the dynamic neurocomputational perspective can give us a better understanding of how we get knowledge and wisdom from the stories told by disciplines such as Literature, History, Anthropology and Theology. This new neurological data can be used to justify the traditional pedagogy of these disciplines, which originally stressed the telling of stories rather than the learning of algorithms.
Introduction
Paul Churchland has argued, I believe correctly, that the experiments he discusses in his books The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul and Plato's Camera require us to rethink many of the fundamental assumptions of cognitive science. In this paper, I will argue that there are also plausible extrapolations from those experiments which require us to rethink so-called "materialist" assumptions about the relationship between the sciences and the humanities. Some might see this as ironic, as Churchland's Eliminative Materialism is usually interpreted as a defense of the toughest possible reduction of all human experience to scientific knowledge. However, many of us have argued that Churchland's ideas lead to a kind of "Neuropragmatism" which actually deprivileges the reductionist materialist assumptions from which those ideas sprang. The main argument of this paper is that the Neurophilosophy that began with the Churchlands provides a scientific explanation for why the humanities provide genuine knowledge that cannot be eliminated by the sciences. HUMAN AFFAIRS 23, 633-644, 2013 DOI: 10.2478 For most of human history, human knowledge was considered to be something that was stored and captured by words. This began to change when Galileo said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics (Galilei 1623) . This claim became more plausible after the discoveries of Newton, and almost undeniable since the numerous developments in math that have strengthened science since then, especially calculus and statistics. It is now an assumption of both scientific and popular common sense that science provides knowledge about the world because it uses mathematical formulae to make predictions about the future. These mathematical formulae are called algorithms by Dan Dennett, and he argues persuasively that until we have such algorithms, we do not have any scientific knowledge at all (Dennett 1995, 48-60; Dennett 2013, 140-142 ).
An Algorithm derives its power from the fact that it "can be counted on-logically-to yield a certain sort of result whenever it is run or instantiated" (Dennett 2013, 140) . This kind of predictability was not possible for most of the history of human knowledge. The sages of the past gave us evocative poetic maxims, and you had to be almost as wise as them to figure out how to apply their wisdom to concrete real life situations. An Algorithm eliminates the need for this kind of discriminating wisdom, by explaining physical processes in "dead simple steps, requiring no wise decisions or delicate judgments or intuitions" (ibid.). The person who designs or discovers an Algorithm needs detailed knowledge and creative imagination. The person who implements the algorithm needs none of these things. In fact, she (or it) need not be a person at all. Another good definition of an algorithm is a process that is "simple enough for a mechanical device-or a dutiful idiot-to perform" (ibid., 141).
There is a powerful plausibility to the idea that only algorithms provide genuine knowledge. It was algorithmic reasoning that made the industrial revolution possible, as an elite of engineers created algorithms that could be followed first by "dutiful idiots" then by unconscious robots. It was not assumed at first that all of reality was fundamentally algorithmic. Descartes argued that mental processes must require some kind of mental substance that could not be reduced to the mechanical steps of an algorithm. But today, the growing sophistication of computer science has reduced many of our most sophisticated mental processes to algorithms, causing white collar jobs to be replaced by computers at the same rate that blue collar jobs were once replaced by factory machinery. It seems that in such a world, the only jobs left for thinking humans is creating and discovering algorithms that machines (or idiots) can implement.
As a result, it is very difficult in our time to explain why anyone should bother to study knowledge which consists only of words unsupported by mathematical formulae. Many people in the humanities have dealt with this problem by mathematizing their disciplines. Philosophers study Plato by reducing his arguments to symbolic logic. English professors read Shakespeare by analyzing statistically recurring sentence structures or using Chomskyian diagrams. History professors stop writing biographies of great historical figures, and start analyzing grain production statistics. Anthropologists stop writing stories about their visits to exotic cultures, and focus on DNA analysis and bone structure. Not every one in these disciplines fits this caricature, of course. The other extreme strategy available is to reject the ambition to actually deliver knowledge, and to see the stories told by novelists, anthropologists, and historians as a kind of entertainment whose existence is justified by their beauty, not their truth. In practice, most scholars in the Humanities take some kind of middle road between these two extremes. Post-modern thinkers, for example, use terms like Gianni Vatimo's "weak thought" (Armstrong 2009, 313) , to imply that their work is sort of like knowledge and sort of like entertainment.
I believe, however, that the stories told by the Humanities do more than just stir our emotions. They deliver genuine knowledge about aspects of reality that are beyond the comprehension of algorithmic knowledge. But in this day and age, I do not think it is enough to rage against the algorithmic machines, and declare "we in the Humanities have knowledge, too!" There is only one method that will demonstrate the epistemic value of stories with any force: Outline the basic elements of an algorithm that shows how we get knowledge out of these stories. Dennett admits that the main challenge of creating algorithmic formula is making them detailed enough that they can be followed by machines or idiots. This implies another question: what is going on inside the minds of people who can correctly follow instructions that are not detailed enough to be functioning algorithms?
Dennett points out that "Algorithms are recipes of sorts designed to be followed by novice cooks" (Dennett 2013, 141; italics in original) . However, Dennett also emphasizes that skilled human beings can accomplish the same tasks with instructions that are far less specific.
A recipe book written for great chefs might include the phrase "poach the fish in a suitable wine until almost done", but an algorithm for the same process might begin "choose a white wine that says 'dry' on the label; take a corkscrew and open the bottle; pour an inch of wine in the bottle of the pan; turn the burner under the pan on high;" . . . a tedious breakdown of the process into dead simple steps, requiring no wise decisions or delicate judgments or intuitions on the part of the recipe-reader (ibid.).
What makes it possible for us to correctly interpret the first kind of vague text when a computer cannot? Unless we believe in magic, and thus give up on the scientific enterprise, we have to say that this is accomplished by some kind of algorithms in our brains (and/or in some part of the brain/body/world nexus). This need not imply, however, that we must learn or understand the mathematical content of those algorithms to run them. We would need to know those algorithms to understand or construct an intuitively skillful human, but not to be one.
Consequently, an understanding of neurocomputational algorithms could be used to justify the claim that there is genuine knowledge which is non-algorithmic. The result would be a justification for educational procedures that do not teach algorithms, but instead give us an opportunity to run the interpretive algorithms we already possess. Rather than succumbing to science envy, and replace the teaching of stories with the teaching of algorithms, we in the humanities should continue to tell our students stories, and teach them how to interpret those stories with wisdom, delicate judgment and intuition. Although many may find this surprising, I will be arguing that the neurocomputational perspective could not only justify these practices, but also show us how to do them more effectively. The heart of my argument is a speculative extrapolation from two recently discovered sets of neurocomputational facts. The first set involves the face recognition program developed by G. Cottrell and his colleagues, and extensively discussed in chapter 2 section 5 of Churchland (2012) . The second set of facts is nicely summed up on p. 178 of Churchland (2012) and arguably supports a theory of perception similar to James' Radical Empiricism. I believe that if we combine these two sets of facts together, the result is an outline for an algorithmic system that could in principle account for our ability to acquire wisdom through stories.
The neurocomputational perspective on images
For our purposes, the essential characteristic of Cottrell's face recognition system is that it does not categorize faces by identifying their attributes. There is nothing in this perceptual system that analyzes the face into "only the mouth, or only the ears, or only the eyes. Whole faces are the evident concern" (Churchland 2012, 64) . To the classical algorithmic perspective, this might at first seem like magical thinking. The basic idea behind algorithmic thinking is that we can understand something complicated only by breaking it up into simple parts, then explaining how those parts fit together. Dennett uses William Lycan's term homuncular functionalism for this principle (Dennett 2013, 91) , and it seems to be an unavoidable principle of human knowledge about the mind, or about anything else. If the only way to understand something is to break it up into parts, then it seems that a mind can't possibly see a whole face as a face without breaking it up into parts i.e. without first seeing that it possesses eyes, ears, mouth etc.
In this case, however, the above inference does not follow. Cottrell's program does indeed follow an algorithm, which can be analyzed into physical components of a sort, but that does not require us to say that the process consists of analyzing its subject matter into components. Instead, each new perception of an individual is categorized by comparing the undivided perception to a vast network of similarly undivided perceptions. We know this because Cottrell's experiments have shown that each node in the second layer of his artificial neural network has a distinct image which makes it "yell its loudest", to use Churchland's evocative metaphor. By this he means that it responds most strongly to what Cottrell's research team calls its preferred input stimulus (Churchland 2012, 64) . Conversely, the less the input stimulus resembles the preferred stimulus, the weaker the signal sent to the output layer. In other words, each node in the second layer of the network sends a signal to the output layer registering how much or how little the input resembles its preferred stimulus. With 80 nodes in the second layer, the output layer thus contains information that compares the input signal to 80 different preferred stimuli. This information makes it possible for the final output layer of this system to respond with a signal that identifies each face it sees, even when the image it receives is the same face seen from a different angle. It can even use higher level categories by distinguishing male from female faces, and faces from non-faces.
All of this is accomplished, however, without analyzing the perceived object into attributes. The input layer receives the light rays that actually reflect off the perceived object. The second or "compression layer" measuring how similar and dissimilar that perception is to each of the prototypes. This comparison process, however, involves no analysis of the perceived object. The perception as a whole is compared to each of the prototypes as a whole. We can (in fact we just did) analyze this process into parts, and Cottrell's team has developed algorithms that explain with mathematical precision exactly how this face recognition system interrelates those parts to perform its function. But the system itself is not analyzing what it perceives into parts. It sees a perceived object as Charlie's face not by inferring this from the fact that it has Charlie's eyes and nose, but by comparing the object as a whole to 80 other prototypical faces.
Most of this is a paraphrase of Churchland (2012, 60-66) , and I believe that its philosophical implications have only begun to be tapped. At the moment, however, I want to focus on their pedagogical implications. If our minds often function in somewhat the same way as Cottrell's system (and that is the only assumption that can scientifically justify this kind of AI research), we are not training our students to their full potential if we are only teaching them how to analyze the world into parts, then reassemble those parts with algorithms. Something else is going on when we identify faces, or melodies, or letters of the alphabet, and learning how to see the world algorithmically will not make us better at doing that. Algorithmic knowledge is necessary in order to build connectionist pattern recognition machines, and both Churchland's and Cottrell's writings are filled with such knowledge. But there is clearly another kind of knowledge embodied in our perceptual faculties, among other places, which utilizes these algorithms without analyzing them or rationally understanding them.
The neurocomputational perspective on stories
The Churchland/Cottrell claim that we perceive images as wholes was a step in the right direction, but Churchland (2012) took one step further towards holism. The Cottrell connectionist system simplified its engineering challenges by making judgments about still photographs. However, biological organisms perceive faces and other things as they move through time and space. Could it be that analyzing this kinetic perception into still pictures was every bit as mistaken as assuming that the still picture of a face was perceived by analyzing it into eyes, ears, nose etc.? In this passage, Churchland suggests that this is an idea we should take seriously.
I want to emphasize the possibility-nay, the probability-that the learning of typical temporal sequences does not proceed by first grasping the one-two-or three dimensional spatial configurations of typical physical objects and properties, and then subsequently noting their temporal conjunctions and progressive modification over time. Rather I suggest, what the brain picks up, first and best, are the typical four-dimensional sequences that it encounters in raw unconceptualized experience. . . Objects and properties are a subsequent abstraction from, not the epistemological ground of, our understanding of the world's causal structure. . .From the point of view of the brain, then, it appears to be processes which are fundamental, not things and their properties ( Churchland 2012, 178-179) .
Churchland has solid scientific evidence to support this possibility. There is evidence that there are numerous recurrent loops in the neural networks of actual biological brains. These recurrent loops feedback a previous signal into the currently perceived signal, which makes it possible to compare changes in the signal that happen over a period of time. There are also algorithms written by neuroscientist Mark Churchland which use these recurrent loops to register patterns in temporal sequences (Churchland 2012, 186) . However, it is important to emphasize that, to my knowledge, no one has ever combined Mark Churchland's algorithms with Cottrell's algorithms, and produced an AI system that could do that level of pattern recognition of different kinds of temporal sequences. There would be a lot of hard algorithmic work necessary before we would have scientific evidence that natural brains work the way that Paul Churchland describes. Code would have to be written, networks would have to be trained, and once trained, those networks would have to be statistically analyzed.
Churchland's above paragraph uses a kind of story telling which might very well inspire future research of this sort. That paragraph, however, contains no actual algorithmic knowledge, which is why it is rightly filled with cautious qualifiers like "possibility", "suggest", and "appears". Churchland has created some actual neurocomputational algorithms, most notably the stereo perception algorithm described in chapter four of Churchland (1995) . He is also scrupulously aware of the difference between algorithmic and non-algorithmic thinking, which is why he always uses these cautious qualifiers when transitioning from the former to the latter. However, Churchland's best and most original work is the stories he tells about other people's algorithms. Neurophilosophy is a discipline that tells stories about neuroscience. These stories provided the primary prototypes for many philosophy papers written since then, including this one. Sometimes these stories have an actual impact on the practice of science by clarifying our thinking about past and/or future research. However, even if it doesn't lead to algorithmic scientific knowledge, such stories can still be vehicles for applying scientific knowledge in a flexibly useful way to real life circumstances. Most human activity outside the laboratory must rely on knowledge based on stories that are not developed into full-fledged algorithms. This kind of story telling is an example of what Churchland calls prototype deployment, and it is both uncertain and the only kind of knowledge we have in most circumstances. As Churchland puts it:
On the whole such a cognitive strategy serves the network well enough. In the real world, no two sensory situations will be strictly identical, so any effective network has no option but to engage in the assimilative strategy at issue. The occasional and inevitable mistakes must be simply endured, perhaps learned from (Churchland 2012, 187 ).
Sometimes we have nothing but stories to assimilate to other stories. However, even when we start with an algorithm, applying it to a real world situation requires some other mental faculty. There is always less data available about real life than for a laboratory situation, and there is also the complicated question of which laboratory experiment most relevantly resembles what is happens right now. This uncertainty is what takes us out of the realm of algorithms and into the realm of stories, even when we start with stories derived from algorithms. What I am striving for is a story based on the algorithms developed by neurally inspired AI that accounts for and evaluates our ability to learn from stories. This story must compare and contrast that ability to the way we learn from algorithms.
Let us then imagine that someone has created a pattern recognition system that is essentially the same as Cottrell's, but which has prototypical preferred input stimuli that are four dimensional "movies" rather than three dimensional pictures. We could for example imagine that the programmer is God, and/or the evolutionary process Dawkins calls the Blind Watchmaker, and that the system in question is a homo sapiens like us. This posit need not commit us to any particular sacred text or lack thereof, but it does enable us to use human phenomenology and biology as raw materials for structural details. This cognitive system has experiences, and classifies those experiences the same basic way as Cottrell's system, but it compares those experiences-as events happening in time-to these internal movies-as events happening in time. This moment of present experience would thus emerge from a complex mathematical function that measures exactly how much or how little an input signal resemble each of these prototypical experiences. If my boss is blond and female, and I am angry about the Wall Street Bailouts, and I feel guilty about arriving late, the activation of the Elizabeth Warren story might be fairly strong. If my boss is tall and male, and I dislike John Wayne, and I feel I had a legitimate reason for being late, the activation of the John Wayne/Lee Marvin film story might be stronger. The important point, however, is that the perceptual signals only become experiences when they are given a location in this vast multidimensional prototype space. It is not the case that the experience consists of sense data, which are strung into a sequence with other sense data to make a film. There are no additional experiential items that have to correspond to items in the network. The location of the experience in this prototype space IS the experience.
AI researchers have a variety of puzzles they would need to solve in order to create algorithms that could implement such a system. But until such a system is built, or even if it is never built, there are still other questions we can ask, and stories we can tell that help to answer them, and thus better understand ourselves. What would it be like to be such a system? Are there other knowledge systems which show relevant isomorphisms with this view of human experience? What does this tell us about possible pedagogical strategies? Does knowledge consist of nothing but algorithms for logical inference from experience? Or are there other ways we can transform experience into skillful activity?
Relevant isomorphisms with other theories
The theory of mind often called GOFAI (good old fashioned artificial intelligence) claims that our thoughts and experiences are constituted by algorithms that make logical inferences from individual propositions. This theory has been challenged in recent years not only by the Neuroscientific data discussed above, but also by problems within AI itself. The theories that arose to confront those problems show a remarkable consilience with the neurally inspired systems developed by Cottrell, and my four dimensional extrapolations from them. If we are dynamic systems of this sort, this would account for many of the aspects of human experience and knowledge described by these researchers and thinkers.
Lakoff and simulation semantics
George Lakoff is proposing a similar theory of cognition when he talks about concepts with "radial structures" (Lakoff 1987, 83) . When he says "the closer an individual is to the prototype, the more representative {that individual} is" (ibid., 82) it seems natural to visualize a Cottrell-style system that comprehends its experiences by locating them in a possibility space of interconnected prototypes. This is only partly accurate. Lakoff specifically says that there is more going on with linguistic cognition than "giving a linear ranking of how close nonprototypical cases are" (Lakoff 1987, 82) . In Lakoff (1987) , he says that the additional factor is "category structure" and defines distance from a prototype by the number of analyzable attributes. For example, he defines the central prototype of "mother" with a list of characteristics, and sees other members of the category (birth mother, stepmother etc.) as occupying points around the central prototype whose distance is determined by how many of those central characteristics are missing. As we mentioned earlier, the Cotrell network measures the similarity between a perceived object and the numerous prototypes without breaking the perception up into attributes.
Obviously, attribute analysis is part of what language does, and linguistics needs to study that process. But in Lakoff's later more neurologically informed work, there are hints of language depending on a non-linguistic process that does not require this kind of analysis. He explains how language hooks up to the world by using Jerome Feldman's concept of "simulation semantics". Feldman argued that that "if you cannot imagine someone picking up a glass, you cannot understand the meaning of 'someone picked up a glass'" (Lakoff 2009, 3) . If a sentence such as "he drank an elephant" (ibid., 12) does not describe an imaginable occurrence, it has no meaning at all. Up to this point, my distinction between algorithms and stories has relied on the distinction between numbers and words. Here I must be more precise, and say that when words are used to tell stories, their primary purpose is paradoxically non-verbal. The primary function of words used to tell stories is to stimulate the imagination. Whenever we understand a story, it is because we have created a simulation of the sort described above by Feldman.
We can, in fact, follow a story even if no words are used at all, such as in silent films and other forms of pantomime. Note, however, that a single picture cannot tell a story, unless we imagine it as part of a mental simulation that happens in time. Simulation semantics thus seems to imply that our minds use a system very much like the one described in my earlier thought experiment. "A meaningful node is one that, when activated, results in the activation of a whole neural simulation" (Lakoff 2009, 3) and those neural simulations are cognitively connected by means of radial structures. If semantics requires these kinds of simulations, this also shows that algorithms require stories in order to be useful or meaningful. Without stories to hook them up to the world, algorithms have syntax but no semantics. Conversely if the stories have enough wisdom in them to provide a really solid and skillful hookup with the world, we can get by with vague and sloppy algorithms. This is why a skilled chef only needs vague instructions like "poach the fish in a suitable wine until almost done".
Dewey and James
Like so many other important and allegedly new ideas, this view of experience was first proposed by the pragmatist philosophers William James and John Dewey. Churchland's claim that "it appears to be processes which are fundamental, not things and their properties" is essentially James' theory of radical empiricism. Dewey shared this view and contrasted it with what he called the sensationalistic empiricism of Locke and Hume (Dewey 1916, 269) . Part of Dewey's and James' criticism of sensationalistic empiricism was a rejection of its atomism i.e. the idea that experience consisted of sense data assembled into wholes by the mind. Both Churchland and Lakoff give us excellent reasons for rejecting this atomism, and for embracing a view that verbal language gets its meaning and reference from its relationship to a unified network of nonverbal experience. However, there is another pragmatist point that is equally important for our purposes. These unified experiences are not just sequences or flows, they are stories, with beginnings, middles and ends that function as introductions, climaxes, and denouements.
One of the main points of Dewey's Art as Experience is that aesthetic experience is not random bits of experience sculpted and shaped by artistic craftsmen. On the contrary, all experience that is really experienced has the aesthetic quality we associate with art and literature. Some experiences are fragmented and directionless, but these are malformed and incomplete, not fundamental and natural. In these anomalous situations "Things are experienced but not in such a way that they are composed into an experience" (Dewey 1934, 35) . In order for an experience to really be an experience, it must have its own kind of unity.
We have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences. A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience. (ibid.).
These descriptions are phenomenology, not neuroscience, but I think they give good reason for describing the prototypical experiences in my thought experiment as stories, not just temporal events. We can learn much by breaking experiences up into parts in a psychology laboratory, just as we can learn a lot about a frog by dissecting it. But no one should think that we can fully understand the frog's natural state if we have only seen it flayed and disemboweled on a table. The frog has goals and purposes as a biological creature living in an ecosystem, and our experiences have an equally purposive structure "integrated within and demarcated in" our life as a lived whole. As Dewey says our experience "is a thing of histories, each with its own plot" (ibid).
Pedagogical strategies
We can now ask James' question about the "Cash value" of the claim that our experiences are fundamentally stories, comprehended by comparing them to other stories. Are there any human practices that should be conducted differently if we accept this as true? Conversely, are there any human practices that deserve more respect, if we now have a theory that can account for their ability to produce genuine wisdom and insight? I begin this paper with the beginnings of an answer to the first question. I gave some prototypical examples of algorithmic thinking inappropriately applied to the humanities. If these resonated with any of my readers, those examples could function as a kind of training set, enabling those readers to extrapolate new examples of their own. There are times when it is appropriate to use algorithms, other times when it is better to plan courses of action by extrapolating from stories. There may be algorithms that can enable us to draw that line skillfully, but I think it more likely we will need to tell each other stories about when stories were inadequate, and other stories about when algorithms were inadequate. With enough well chosen stories, our minds can synthesize a network of prototypes, compare each new experience to that network, and make intuitive judgments about the best choice in each case. This is pretty much how decision-making based on stories usually works. Sometimes we talk about what lessons stories teach and try to formulate those lessons into quasialgorithmic maxims. Most of what we learn from stories, however, is in a form that cannot be expressed in sentences. This is a point that Churchland stresses about neurocomputations (Churchland 1989, 63 ). This may not be immediately obvious to everyone, because most neural network models, including Cottrell's, are given a linguistic gloss which is biologically very inaccurate. In Cotrell's model, certain outputs were arbitrarily posited as symbolizing certain faces, and then the network was trained to produce that output whenever that face was present. In contrast, most biological connectionist networks have no relationship to language at all. Instead they directly map perceptual space onto behavioral space. In what Churchland calls first order learning (Churchland 2012 , chapters 2 and 3), these mappings enable us to do things like adjust our fingers to the sounds of a musical instrument as we play it. In what Churchland calls second order learning (ibid., chapter 4) these mappings are applied to new situations, which is why our intuitive skills for playing guitar make it easier to learn the saxophone. This ability to link prototypes into a new network, and deploy that network to a new situation, is what gives us our uniquely human flexibility and creativity.
Language, or film, or direct interactions with people, expose us to stories of skillful virtuosity, and/or grave errors that serve as cautionary tales, and these stories increase our skills by means of second order learning. Each story becomes imbedded in a network of prototypes, and this unverbalizable network is what constitutes our skill set. Everything we learn from those stories cannot be verbalized in an Aesop-style moral tacked on the end. If we try to verbally or mathematically explain how we made our choices, the result is usually vague and sloppy algorithms. The best we can do is usually something like "This situation is sort of like X, a very little Y, and a lot like Z. So I'm going to do W." No computer could ever run an algorithm as vague as this. The only reason we can make reasonably good decisions with this kind of "reasoning" is that these words do not contain the reasons, but only point to the multidimensional network of prototypes that is doing the actual cognitive work.
There is an old joke that the only thing we ever learn from history is that we never learn from history. What this joke gets right is that it really is impossible to formulate algorithms that can predict historical events the way the algorithms of physics can predict the behavior of chemicals and molecules. Economics comes close on occasion, particularly when it is studying people motivated by physical forces like the threat of starvation. (Physics algorithms are also very good at predicting how people will fall when thrown out of tenth story windows.) However, when people's behavior is motivated by more abstract factors, such as fame or emotional security, the algorithms of economics start to lose their semantic hold on human behavior, and their mathematically impeccable syntax is of far less use. At that point, economics begins to resemble the other humanities as it resorts to telling stories about things like "animal spirits" and "creative destruction". Nevertheless, history is filled with stories that can teach us about the human condition, even though those stories cannot be refined to algorithms. Barack Obama deliberately modeled his presidency after Lincoln's when he chose his cabinet to be a "team of rivals", but he had no algorithm for determining the exact balance between teamwork and rivalry. Officers at military academies study the great battles of the past, but they will never be in battles exactly like any of those that they study. Nevertheless, reading and thinking about the strategies of Robert E. Lee, Napoleon, and Eisenhower will enable them to think quickly, creatively and skillfully in the heat of battle, which is why military leaders continue to study military history. Although MBAs do study the algorithms of economics, they also learn negotiating skills by studying historical stories of great negotiators, and leadership skills by studying historical stories of great visionary leaders like Henry Ford and Steve Jobs. These skills cannot be reduced to algorithms, which is why building a successful company or winning a battle cannot be taught the way calculus can be taught. Knowledge based on stories increases the probability of success, but it does not guarantee success. It is often difficult to decide which prototypical story a real life situation most closely resembles. (Is the Iraq war more like Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia, or more like Vietnam?) But there is no question that we can get better at making certain kinds of decisions if we carefully study the stories told by non-algorithmic disciplines like history, political science, and cultural anthropology.
In fact, it doesn't actually matter that much if the stories being told are true. When Cottrell analyzed the preferred input stimuli for his face recognition system, he discovered that none of those preferred stimuli were actual faces from the original training set. In other words, the system was not comparing new faces to ones it had already seen; it was comparing them to prototypical faces it had made up. Nevertheless, these made-up faces provided an effective guide through the world of real faces, because they were synthesized from perceptions of real faces. In much the same way, great writers like Dickens and Shakespeare synthesize prototypical characters from their experiences of real people. This is why their stories contain truths about real people, even though factually the stories are false. It is widely recognized that writers need to gather real experiences before they can create profound imaginary ones. In Dickens'case, much of this experience was acquired by working as a court reporter at criminal trials. Even though characters like Fagin and Wackford Squeers are imaginary, we can learn more about human evil from studying them than from studying the original court records that inspired them. This is not to say that factual truth makes no difference. We learn from history very differently from the way we learn from fiction, which is why making up stories and printing them as journalism is criminal fraud. Articulating those very important differences would require at least a book. With that in mind, we can legitimately discuss some of the similarities. History is not just collecting facts. No biographer is going to list everything that the subject ever had for breakfast. Certain facts are historically significant, other are not. One way of describing that difference is to say that significant facts are those that form some kind of worthwhile story. This description is complicated by the fact that worthwhileness in literature and history are measured by different standards. Even if Shakespeare's Richard III is historical propaganda slanted towards the prejudices of its original audience, it is still great literature that teaches us much about the ruthlessness of power politics. Nevertheless, some people do fault Hannah Arendt for allegedly making a similar error: Formulating the profoundly universal concept of the Banality of Evil, and inaccurately applying it to Adolph Eichmann. Good literature and philosophy can sometimes be bad history, because higher truth is distinct from facts. Despite these important differences, however, both history and literature are non-algorithmic disciplines that teach us by telling stories. These stories help us make sense out of our daily encounters with each other, where the laws of physics are too abstract to be of any use.
Stories are also our only epistemic stratagem when we deal with questions that are so abstract that they transcend both physics and our daily experience i.e. metaphysics and theology. When theological historian Karen Armstrong claimed that we must divide our epistemic efforts into Logos and Mythos, (Armstrong 2009 ) she was to some degree applying my distinction between algorithms and stories to theology. Unfortunately, it is a sign of our current faith in algorithms that these days the word "myth" usually means "falsehood" or "lie", and thus her point was widely misinterpreted. Myths are not lies when they are the only epistemic strategy available to us. When the facts of research and history cannot answer a question, it is fully appropriate to rely instead on the truths of myth and literature. The point of this article is that some recently discovered neurocomputational algorithms can help us understand how we use these stories to make sense out of our experience. This understanding provides justification for teaching the stories which are the primary subject matter of the humanities, as they were originally understood.
